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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
KIRK A. LOFTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 39670-2012
Ada Co. No. CR-FE-2003-1501

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

I. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction to impose judgment for a felony since the
Information in this case failed to allege either the correct statute or facts constituting the charged
offense's necessary element of willful infliction of a traumatic injury?

II. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED
The Court of Appeals has decided an issue not in accord with the decisions of this Court.
I.AR. 11 S(b)(2).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the denial of an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correctanjllegal
sentence.
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Appellant Kirk Loftis asks this Court to accept review, vacate the felony judgment, and remand
for imposition of a misdemeanor sentence with credit for time served.

B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
Mr. Loftis was charged by Information with a single count of domestic violence in the
presence of a child. CR 21 1• The Information alleged, in pertinent part:
KIRK A LOFTIS is/are accused by this Information of the crime(s) of:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, LC.
§18-903, 918(7)(b) which crime(s) was/were committed as follows:
That the Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day of October,
2003, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did actually, intentionally and
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Kim Richards, to wit: by
punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and strangling
her by the neck, while in the presence of a child, to wit
four (4) years
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household members.
CR21.
Mr. Loftis went to trial on the charge and was convicted. T p. 151, In. 11-17. He was
sentenced to a term of twenty years with ten years fixed. CR 79. A Notice of Appeal was timely
filed. CR 86.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Loftis, 2007 Unpublished
Opinion No. 349, Docket No. 31003 (Ct. App. 2007), review denied. The Court of Appeals
rejected Mr. Loftis's argument under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) and Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979), that the state had not proved that he and Ms. Richards were
household members at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals found they were household

This Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript in State
v. Loftis, No. 31102 by order dated May 2, 2012. The original clerk's record will be cited as
"CR." The limited clerk's record prepared for this appeal will be cited as "LCR." "T" refers to
the transcripts of the trial proceedings in Docket No. 31102.
1
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members because they were cohabitating under the definition of cohabitation found in State v.

Hansell, 141 Idaho 587,590, 114 P.3d 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2005). Hansell held that two people
were cohabitants (and thus "household members") if they lived together.
Mr. Loftis argued in this 2007 Petition for Review to this Court that Ransell's definition
of cohabitants was incorrect. Unfortunately for him, this Court did not address that issue until
much later. When it finally did, however, it confirmed that Mr. Loftis had been right all along:
"The holding in Hansell, on which the State heavily relies, does not affect our conclusion
because it is an incorrect reading of the statute and, in any event, decisions of the Court of
Appeals are not binding on this Court." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,867,264 P.3d 970, 974
(2011 ). Thus, Mr. Loftis' s argument was ahead of its time. If his direct appeal were pending
today, the Court of Appeals would be required to vacate the judgment and remand to the trial
court for entry of a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor battery under Schulz.
On December 19, 2011, Mr. Loftis filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under
I.C.R. 35(a) and a brief in support of the motion. LCR 7-8; 9-13. In his brief, Mr. Loftis
correctly noted that "[n]o person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal
conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof." LCR 10, quoting I.C. § 19-101. He went on to
argue that the charging document in the case was insufficient to confer felony jurisdiction on the
district court and all he was charged with was misdemeanor simple battery under LC. §18-903.
LCR 10-11. He also alerted the court to this Court's opinion in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252
P.3d 1255 (2011), where the Court wrote "where it is apparent from the record that the act that
the defendant was criminally convicted for is not a crime according to the laws of this state, this
court has the authority to vacate the conviction sua sponte ... "Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d
3 •
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at 1258, quoting State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,484, 80 P.3d 1083, 1085 (2003). LCR 11.
The district court denied the motion reasoning as follows:
The maximum sentence for committing Domestic Violence in the Presence of a
Child is twenty (20) years. LC.§ 18-918(2), (4). Thus, Mr. Loftis's twenty-year
sentence is fixed within the limits of the statute, and the sentence does not need to
be corrected.
To the extent that Mr. Loftis challenging his conviction on the basis that it was
improperly titled, his argument is frivolous. Section 18-918 is clearly titled
"Domestic Violence." To the extent that Mr. Loftis is challenging the
constitutionality of his conviction, his arguments are untimely.
LCR 16.
This appeal timely followed. LCR 18.
The Court of Appeals affirmed writing:
Here, the information accused Loftis of "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully
commit[ing] a traumatic injury .... " A fair and reasonable reading of this
language plainly indicates that Loftis purposefully inflicted said injury.
Consequently, the facts contained in the information are sufficient to allege that
the act was done "willfully."
2013 Unpublished Opinion, No. 529, pg. 4. (A true and correct copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion is attached as Exhibit A.)
A timely Petition for Review was filed.

IV. WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED
As noted above, the Court of Appeals held that the word "intentionally" was sufficient to
allege that he was charged with "willfully" inflicting a traumatic injury. That is incorrect.
"Intentionally" only alleges a general intent to commit a battery, i.e., an intentional touching. It
is not a substitute for the word "willfully," which alleges that Mr. Loftis purposefully inflicted a
traumatic injury, as opposed to purposefully committed a battery. The Information only alleged a
4 •
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general intent crime, not a specific intent crime, which is the difference in this case between a
felony and a misdemeanor. Thus, as shown below, the Court of Appeals' decision here is in
conflict with the decisions of this Court and review should be granted.

A. Standard ofReview
Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an information,
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho. State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004).

The claim that an information fails to charge an offense and was jurisdictionally deficient
can be raised at any time, including in an I.C.R. 35 motion, and even for the first time on appeal.
See l.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 300, 1 P.3d 795, 801(2000); State v. Cahoon,

116 Idaho 399,400, 775 P.2d 1241, 1242 (1989); see also State v. Lute, supra Gurisdictional
challenge raised for the first time in a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence). When a
challenge to the information is not raised before trial, the charging document will "be upheld
unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge an offense
for which the defendant is convicted." Id.
A tardily-challenged Information must allege at least one of the following two things in
order to be found to confer jurisdiction: 1) the correct code section; or 2) facts constituting the
crime charged. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). This
is one of those rare cases where the Information, even under its most liberal construction, fails to
allege either of those and thus does not charge a felony offense. Consequently, it did not confer
subject-matter jurisdiction on the court for anything other than a misdemeanor offense and the
twenty-year sentence imposed is illegal.

5 •
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B. The Information Does Not Allege the Correct Code Section
In Jones and Cahoon, the Court held that when an objection to a charging document is
not made until after the entry of judgment, if the applicable code section is named in the charging
document, its language may be read into the text of the charge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758-59, 101
P.3d at 702-03; Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 400, 775 P.2d at 1242. In those cases, however, the
charging document named the applicable code section under which the defendant was charged.
In this case, the correct code section was never named. The Information alleged a violation of
"LC. §18-903, 918(7)(b)[.]" CR 21. Section 903 of Title 18 is the general battery statute. In
October of 2003, Section 918(3) of Title 18 was the felony domestic violence statute2 and
Section 9 l 8(7)(b) was a penalty enhancement provision. Thus, the state failed to name the
applicable code section for felony domestic battery in 2003 - LC. § 918(3) - and the rule in

Jones and Cahoon mentioned above does not save the Information.
C. The Information Does Not Allege All the Facts Necessary to Constitute the Charge
At the time of the offense, the state was required to prove that Mr. Loftis and Kim
Richards were "household members," that Mr. Loftis committed "a battery, as defined in section
18-903, Idaho Code, and [that he] willfully and unlawfully inflict[ ed] a traumatic injury." LC. §
18-918(3) (2003). The Information, however, omitted the willfulness element and only alleged
that he "did actually, intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of
Kim Richards, to wit: by punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by her hair and
strangling her by the neck ... where Kim Richards and the defendant are household members."
CR 21-22. These allegations are insufficient to charge an offense because the statute in 2003

2
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required the specific intent to cause a traumatic injury. State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458,460, 95
P.3d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 2004) 3 • The Court of Appeals wrote that "[i]n order for Sohm to be found
guilty of domestic battery, the state was required to prove not only that he committed a battery
but also that he willfully inflicted a traumatic injury upon another household member. I.C. §
18-918(3)." (Emphasis in original.) Additionally, willfulness was found to be a "material
element of the offense." Id. All the Information here alleges is a general intent offense, i.e., that
Mr. Loftis intentionally committed a battery. Thus, the total failure to allege a material element
of the offense did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals' analysis of the charging document here is in conflict with the
Court's opinion in Jones. The Court should follow the two-part analysis set forth in Jones and
find that: 1) the correct code section was not alleged in the Information and 2) no facts were set
forth which, in any form or by fair construction, can be found to have alleged that Mr. Loftis
willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. Accordingly, the trial court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction to sentence for a felony offense.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the judgment and sentence and
remand for a sentence on the misdemeanor charge of simple battery.
Respectfully submitted thisl~~ay of July, 2013.

~~~~Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Kirk A. Loftis

As recognized in State v. Murray, 143 Idaho at 535-36, 148 P.3d at 1281-82, Sohm was
modified by this Court on other grounds in State v. Jones 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699.
3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on July\~, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be
~mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:

Jessica Lorello
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

u~s. ,<~---~
Dennis Benjamin
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 39670

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
KIRK A. LOFTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 529
Filed: June 10, 2013
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

----------------~)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge.
Order denying motion to vacate conviction, affirmed.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Dennis A. Benjamin, Boise, for
appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
LANSING, Judge
Kirk Loftis appeals the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. He contends that his sentence is illegal because the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the felony charge for which Loftis was convicted and
sentenced.
I.

BACKGROUND
In late 2003, Kirk Loftis and Kim Richards were living together. Although they had
signed a lease together, the stress of unemployment had strained the relationship, and in
September Richards asked Loftis to move out.

Over the next few days the two talked,

presumably in an attempt to reconcile, but on October 1, the discussion deteriorated into a
violent confrontation. Richards later testified that Loftis hit her, wrestled with her, pulled her
hair, choked her, pushed her, and the like. Richards' daughter was present for the struggle. A

EXHIBITA

neighbor who witnessed part of the fight called the police.

The State filed an information

charging Loftis as follows:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY,
LC. § 18-903, 918(7)(6) which crimes was/were committed as follows:
That Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day of October,
2003, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did actually, intentionally and
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Kim Richards, to-wit:
by punching the victim in the face and head, pulling her by the hair and strangling
her by the neck, while in the presence of a child, to-wit: [A.R.,] four (4) years
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household members.
After a trial, Loftis was found guilty of felony domestic violence in the presence of
children. In 2011, Loftis filed a motion to vacate his sentence and/or conviction on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

According to Loftis, the information was

sufficient to allege only misdemeanor domestic violence, and the district court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to convict and sentence him for a felony. The district court denied the motion.
On appeal, Loftis again asserts that his felony conviction and sentence are illegal and
should be vacated because the district court lacked jurisdiction. He argues that he should be
sentenced on remand for misdemeanor battery because that is the only offense for which the
charging information conferred jurisdiction on the district court.
II.

ANALYSIS
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides an avenue for a defendant to correct an illegal sentence,
and such a motion may be filed "at any time." Here, Loftis's challenge to his sentence is actually
a challenge to the underlying felony conviction. Idaho courts have long held that Rule 35 may
not be used as a means-to collaterally attack a conviction. See State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 725,
85 P.3d 1117, 1124 (Ct. App. 2003); Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499
(Ct. App. 1991). However, in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P.3d 1255 (2011), the Idaho
Supreme Court entertained a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction that was
presented through a Rule 35 motion. The Corni said, "[W]herc a court properly has jurisdiction
to consider a case--as it does here to consider Lute's [Ruic] 35 motion--and it is apparent that
there is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for
something that is not a crime, this Court must correct that error." lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252

2

P.3d at 1258. Therefore, we will consider Loftis's challenge to the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction presented via his Rule 35 motion.
In criminal cases, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on a court by the filing of an
information alleging that an offense, as defined by Idaho law, was committed within the State of
Idaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004). See also Lute, 150
Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258. The district court's jurisdictional power, therefore, depends on
the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758,
101 P.3d at 702. Whether a charging document is legally sufficient is a question of law subject
to free review. Id. at 757, 101 P.3d at 701.

Such a challenge may be raised at any time,

including for the first time on appeal. Id.
While a challenge to the information's sufficiency can be heard at any time, the standard
against which the information is measured differs depending upon when the challenge is brought.

State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 167-68, 75 P.3d 219, 221-22 (Ct. App. 2003). If an alleged
deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea, the charging document
must set forth all facts essential to establish the charged offense to survive the challenge. Id. at
168, 75 P.3d at 222. This requires only "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged." State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d
491,493 (Ct. App. 1991). When the information's sufficiency is not challenged until after trial,
the standard is lower, and the information "will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does
not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge [the] offense for which the defendant [was]
convicted." Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703 (quoting Robran, 119 Idaho at 287, 805
P.2d at 493).

This standard affords the reviewing court "considerable leeway to imply the

necessary allegations from the language of the Information." Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P .3d
at 703. When the objection to the charging document is not made until after entry of judgment,
if the applicable code section is named in the charging document its language may be read into
the text of the charge. Id.
At the time of Loftis's offense, a felony conviction for domestic violence required that an
individual both "commit[] a battery" and "willfully and unlawfully inflict[] a traumatic injury."

3

LC. § 18-918(3) (2003); 1 State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505-06, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106-07 (Ct.
App. 2003). Loftis acknowledges that the information alleged that he committed a battery, but
contends that it did not adequately allege that he willfully inflicted a traumatic injury. Therefore,
the only issue on appeal is whether a fair and reasonable reading of the information implies the
necessary element of willful infliction of traumatic injury.
Idaho Code informs us that the word "willfully" refers to the "intent with which an act is
done ... [, and] implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act ...." LC. § 18101 (I). 2 Idaho case law has long found common ground between the term "willfully" and the
term "intentionally." See Archbold v. Huntington, 34 Idaho 558, 565, 201 P. 1041, 1043 (1921)
(willfully is "nearly synonymous with 'intentionally' 'designedly' 'without lawful excuse,' and
therefore not accidental"); State v. Hall, 90 Idaho 478, 489-90, 413 P.2d 685, 692 (1966) (citing

Archbold and noting that willfully "implies the conscious commission of a wrong"); State v.
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 783, 992 P.2d 775, 778 (1999) (approving the district court's reasoning
that, "The word 'willfully' . . . is . . . nearly synonymous with 'intentionally."').

Here, the

information accused Loftis of "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully commit[ting] a traumatic
injury . . . . "

A fair and reasonable reading of this language plainly indicates that Loftis

purposefully inflicted said injury.

Consequently, the facts contained in the information are

sufficient to allege that the act was done "willfully."
Because the information's factual allegations assert all the charged crime's necessary
elements, we need not consider whether the information's citation of Idaho Code§§ 18-903 and
l 8-9 l 8(7)(b) was sufficient to allow the court to read into the information all necessary elements
of the charged offense. Nor do we need at this time to determine whether correctly titling the
offense in the charging document would be sufficient (either alone or in combination with other

Section 18-918 was reordered in 2004, so that felony domestic battery was thereafter LC.
§ 18-918(2)(a) & (b). 2004 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 118 at 393. Additionally, in 2005 the Idaho
Legislature deleted the words "willfully and unlawfully." 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 158 at
488.
2

While certain cases have limited the definition found in I.C. § 18-101 (1) with regard to
crimes such as J.C. § 18-918; they have done so merely to eliminate the circularity introduced by
inclusion of the second sentence, which would eviscerate the plain meaning of the term within
the context of those statutory sections. See, e.g., State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372-73,
64 P.3d 296, 298-99 (2001); State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 460-61, 95 P.3d 76, 78-79 (Ct. App.
2004).

4

indications of the crime alleged) to impart subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, we need not
address Loftis's premise that an information which alleged only a misdemeanor would not confer
"jurisdiction" for a felony conviction, as opposed to presenting a due process issue that would be
waived if not raised before a trial or guilty plea. We do, however, reject the argument that
jurisdiction can be conferred only by verbatim recitation of statutory language (e.g., "willfully")
or explicit reference to an Idaho Code subsection number (e.g., I.C. § 18-918(3)). See, e.g.,
Robran,119 Idaho at 288, 805 P.2d at 494.

The district court's order denying Loftis's Rule 35 motion is affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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